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ESTABLISHING THE NEXUS: THE DEFINITIVE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CHILD MOLESTATION AND POSSESSION OF CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE 
Megan Westenberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Child sexual offenders often sexually exploit children through the 
collection, creation, or distribution of child pornography.  Up to one 
quarter of child molesters collect child pornography.1  This number 
increases each day as the Internet continues to make collection of child 
pornography more readily accessible.  Accordingly, “[c]hild 
pornography, especially that produced by the offender, is one of the 
most valuable pieces of evidence of child sexual victimization any 
investigator can have.”2 
In the last half decade, federal courts of appeals have issued a handful 
of conflicting opinions as to whether evidence of child molestation, 
alone, creates probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography.  
Part II of this Comment paves a background of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence necessary for this discussion.  Part II also elucidates two 
lines of cases that address the foregoing issue.  First, one circuit, as well 
as concurring and dissenting judges in other circuits, have concluded 
that given the intuitive relationship between child molestation and child 
pornography, evidence of child molestation is sufficient probable cause 
for a search for child pornography.  Second, other circuits have split 
with the foregoing interpretation and have held that, because child 
molestation and possession of child pornography are separate, distinct 
crimes, evidence of one cannot be used as the sole probable cause to 
acquire a search warrant for the other. 
Part III examines the innate and definitive relationship between child 
molestation and child pornography.  With support from recent studies 
and other scholarly and governmental sources, Part III argues that child 
sexual offenders possess the means and predisposition to possess child 
pornography.  Accordingly, in applying a fluid concept of probable 
 
             *   Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. KENNETH V. LANNING, NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD 
MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 108 (5th ed. 2010), available at 
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf [hereinafter Lanning, Child Molesters].  In 
the inverse, a collection of studies reveals that about 20% of child pornography collectors molest 
children.  Id.  Lanning reconciles these low numbers by concluding that many investigations of child 
molestation do not pursue the possibility of child pornography collection—precisely the topic of this 
Comment.  See id. 
 2. Id. at 59. 
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cause, the narrow connection between the two crimes allows evidence or 
an affirmed incidence of child molestation to be adequate probable 
cause for a warrant to search for child pornography.  An affidavit read in 
its totality and in a common sense manner justifies the search and 
reinforces the need to combat child sexual exploitation.  Finally, Part IV 
concludes that because studies have shown a definitive correlation 
between child molestation and a child molester’s possession of child 
pornography, evidence of child molestation behavior should serve as an 
adequate basis for a warrant to search for child pornography. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A brief overview of the Fourth Amendment and cases pertinent to this 
Comment is warranted.  Accordingly, Subpart A of this Part discusses 
the Fourth Amendment and the basis for probable cause. Subpart B 
addresses a brief history of the criminalization of child pornography.  
Finally, Subparts C and D examine the dichotomous opinions that 
address whether child molestation can be the sole probable cause basis 
for a search for child pornography. 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Probable Cause Standard 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” and requires that “no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized.”3  The first step in the warrant application process is 
for the investigating law enforcement officer to prepare an application to 
be submitted to a magistrate judge.  To be valid, “a warrant application 
must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been 
committed” (the “commission” element), “and (2) enumerated evidence 
of the offense will be found at the place to be searched” (the so-called 
“nexus” element).4  The law enforcement officer then drafts an affidavit 
in which, under oath or by affirmation, the officer sets out the facts that 
he believes justifies the warrant.  A magistrate judge then examines the 
affidavit and, if the affidavit is approved, issues the search warrant. 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment invokes the 
exclusionary rule, whereby evidence collected in violation of one’s 
constitutional rights generally becomes inadmissible in a criminal 
proceeding.5  However, in United States v. Leon,6 the Supreme Court 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 4. E.g., United States v. Ribeiro, 397 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 5. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
2
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held that the exclusionary rule barring illegally obtained evidence from 
the courtroom does not apply to evidence seized in objectively 
reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate judge, even where the warrant is later found to be invalid.7 
Illinois v. Gates8 is the leading case for determining whether or when 
probable cause exists.  There, the Supreme Court declared that probable 
cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal 
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”9  Given that affidavits 
are usually drafted by law enforcement officers in the midst of a 
criminal investigation, the Court found that the need for an immediate 
warrant does not require elaborate technicality or specificity within the 
affidavit.10  Thus, the magistrate issuing the warrant must use mere 
common sense to determine whether, given the totality of the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a mild probability that 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.11  Ultimately, so 
long as the magistrate possessed a “‘substantial basis 
for . . . [concluding]’ that a search would uncover evidence of 
wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.”12 
B. The Criminalization of Child Pornography 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the compelling and 
legitimate interest in protecting the psychological, emotional, and 
physical development of children from the harmful effects of child 
pornography.  To illustrate, in New York v. Ferber,13 the Supreme Court 
held that the distribution and sale of even non-obscene child 
pornography could be criminalized because, inter alia, “a [s]tate’s 
interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
 
909–10 (1984) (noting that the rule applies “only where it result[s] in appreciable deterrence” and, even 
when it results in deterrence, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs). 
 6. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 7. Id. at 922.  The Court reasoned that, “even assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively 
deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to 
conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, 
to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.”  Id. at 918–19.  Accordingly, so long as 
evidence is obtained with a reasonable reliance on a magistrate-issued warrant, evidence will be 
admissible notwithstanding whether or not the search violated one’s privacy rights.  See id. at 922.  This 
is known as the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. 
 8. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 9. Id. at 244 n.13. 
 10. Id. at 235. 
 11. Id. at 238.  The magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be paid great deference.  
United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). 
 12. Gates, 462 U.S. at 246 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). 
 13. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).  
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minor’ is compelling.”14  Moreover, in Osborne v. Ohio,15 the Court 
upheld criminal sanctions for the private possession of child 
pornography.16 
Whether the criminalization of child pornography conflicts with First 
Amendment jurisprudence is outside the scope of this Comment.17  
Rather, this Comment seeks to show that because there is such an 
instinctive and definitive relationship between child molestation and 
possession of child pornography, evidence of the former is an adequate 
basis for probable cause for a search warrant for the latter.  That the 
Supreme Court has long recognized the repugnance and criminality of 
child pornography suggests that states and their law enforcement 
officers must strive to achieve the compelling interest of protecting the 
safety and physical and psychological well-being of children.  
C. The Holding in United States v. Colbert18 that Child Molestation 
Creates Probable Cause for a Search for Child Pornography 
In United States v. Colbert, the Eighth Circuit found that a 
commonsense link between child molestation and child pornography 
exists such that evidence of the former suffices as probable cause for the 
latter.19  The court reasoned that “[t]here is an intuitive relationship 
between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of 
child pornography.”20 
In this case, detectives investigated a complaint of suspicious activity 
when the defendant was seen pushing a young girl on a swing and 
talking about certain “videos” he had at home for her to watch.21  While 
detectives questioned the defendant, other law enforcement officers 
drafted an affidavit to search for child pornography in the defendant’s 
home, primarily because he “attempted to lure a five year old female to 
go to his apartment.”22  The district judge issued the warrant.23  Upon 
 
 14. Id. at 756–57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
 15. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
 16. Id. at 111.  The current statute criminalizing possession of child pornography is 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1466A (2006). 
 17. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that, in criminalizing possession of child pornography, 
the Supreme Court justified its departures from its First Amendment jurisprudence on the grounds that 
images of child pornography are the product of child sex abuse, that the state has an important interest in 
protecting the victims of child sex abuse, and that reducing demand for child pornography by 
prosecuting possessors of child pornography could thus reduce the instances of child sex abuse.  
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 130–32. 
 18. 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (2011). 
 19. Id. at 576–77. 
 20. Id. at 578. 
 21. Id. at 575. 
 22. Id. 
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searching, law enforcement officers uncovered numerous computer 
discs containing child pornography.24  The district court found the 
warrant was supported with ample probable cause to uncover child 
pornography because “individuals sexually interested in children 
frequently utilize child pornography to reduce the inhibitions of their 
victims.”25 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that “sexual depictions of 
minors could be logically related to the crime of child enticement.”26  
Further, the Eighth Circuit awarded deference to the district judge who 
issued the warrant, concluding that it was reasonable for him to believe 
that the defendant was enticing the young child to come back to his 
house to watch “videos,” thereby establishing a reasonable link between 
potential child molestation and possession of child pornography.27  
The Eighth Circuit rejected other circuits’ conclusions that there is a 
categorical distinction between child pornography and other types of 
sexual exploitation of children, such as child molestation.28  Instead, it 
found that “that distinction seems to be in tension both with common 
experience and a fluid, non-technical conception of probable cause.”29  
The court then illustrated the link between child pornography and child 
molestation, emphasizing that suspicion of child molestation suffices as 
probable cause for child pornography partly because computers have 
been increasingly characterized as “tools of the trade for those who 
sexually prey on children.”30  The court continued: 
For individuals seeking to obtain sexual gratification by abusing children, 
possession of child pornography may very well be a logical precursor to 
physical interaction with a child: the relative ease with which child 
 
 23. Id. at 576. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 577. 
 26. Id.  Judges in other circuits have reached similar conclusions.  See United States v. Falso, 
544 F.3d 110, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (Livingston, J., concurring) (in finding ample probable cause, Judge 
Livingston reasoned that, since child porn is often used to entice young victims, “a person of reasonable 
caution would take into account predilections revealed by past crimes or convictions as part of the 
inquiry into probable cause.” (quoting United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006))); 
United States v. Adkins, 169 Fed. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 854 (2006), 
549 U.S. 856 (2006) (since preferential offenders, meaning those whose sexual gratifications focus 
exclusively on children, devote a lot of time, money, and energy to the pursuit of child pornography or 
sexual contact with children, evidence that one is a preferential offender will generally constitute 
probable cause for child pornography). 
 27. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79. 
 28. Id. at 578. 
 29. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–32 (1983)).  The court continued: “[e]vidence 
adduced to support probable cause must be ‘weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as 
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.’”  Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232). 
 30. Id.; See also, e.g., United States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (reaching a 
similar conclusion). 
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pornography may be obtained on the internet might make it a simpler and 
less detectable way of satisfying pedophilic desires.31 
Because child pornography is often an “electronic record of child 
molestation,”32 then “common sense would indicate that a person who is 
sexually interested in children is likely to also be inclined, i.e., 
predisposed, to order and receive child pornography.”33 
D. Opinions Holding that Child Molestation Does Not Create Probable 
Cause to Search for Child Pornography 
Most recently, the Third Circuit has split with the Eighth Circuit and 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not allow evidence of child 
sexual abuse to confer probable cause for a search for child 
pornography.34  In Virgin Islands v. John, allegations that the defendant, 
a middle school teacher, sexually abused many of his young female 
students at school were “not sufficient to establish—or even to hint at—
probable cause as to the wholly separate crime of possessing child 
pornography.”35  Nor did the good faith exception apply.36  The majority 
reasoned that because the question of whether there exists a child sexual 
assault–pornography correlation is “one that can be resolved only 
through the evaluation of evidence, it must be alleged on the face of the 
affidavit in order to be considered for purposes of determining probable 
cause.”37  Thus, the court hinted that evidence of child molestation 
might, in some cases, be sufficient probable cause for child 
pornography.  Given that a court “demand[s] nothing more than that an 
officer seeking a warrant explain why she is justified in entering a 
person’s home and searching through his belongings,”38 perhaps a more 
 
 31. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (citing United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994)).  Judge Gibson 
dissented in Colbert.  Judge Gibson maintained that, “[p]erhaps it is true that all or most people who are 
attracted to minors collect child pornography . . . [however,] an individual’s Fourth Amendment right 
cannot be vitiated based on fallacious inferences drawn from facts not supported by the affidavit.”  Id. at 
579 (Gibson, J., dissenting).  Judge Gibson concluded that, even if a relationship exists between child 
enticement and child pornography, “it was unreasonable for the magistrate judge . . . to infer such a 
nexus without further evidence to support that inference.”  Id. at 580–81.  Thus, for Judge Gibson, an 
affidavit that explicitly explained the nexus between child molestation and possession of child 
pornography may have proven sufficient to support probable cause.  See infra notes 37–39 and 
accompanying text and note 121. 
 34. V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 35. Id. at 419.  In this case, although no child pornography was found at the defendant’s home 
during the search, evidence was seized that would support charges of rape, unlawful sexual conduct, 
child abuse and child neglect.  Id. at 414. 
 36. Id. at 413; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 37. V.I, 654 F.3d at 419. 
 38. Id. at 420. 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/9
2012] COMMENT—ESTABLISHING THE NEXUS 343 
detailed affidavit explaining why a teacher who had been repeatedly 
accused of sexually molesting his students would possess child 
pornography would have sufficed.39 
Judge Fuentes wrote a strongly worded dissent, asserting first that the 
majority should have applied the good faith exception.40 Judge Fuentes 
wrote that suppressing the evidence “offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system,”41 and that “‘suppression would do nothing to 
deter police misconduct in these circumstances . . . because it would 
come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety.’”42  Judge 
Fuentes maintained that given the circuit split and differing expert 
opinions, it was not unreasonable for the investigating officer to deem 
that probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation provided 
probable cause to search for child pornography.43  He further avowed 
that it was reasonable for the investigating officer to believe that “there 
was a fair probability that a man accused of molesting children and 
recording his crimes in one medium—a written journal—might also 
record them in another—photographs.”44  Judge Fuentes concluded by 
reiterating the progeny of Illinois v. Gates:  
[E]vidence must be “seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by 
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement . . . [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”45 
 
 Similarly, in Dougherty v. Covina,46 a Ninth Circuit case, the 
 
 39. That is, would have sufficed to the majority panel of the Third Circuit in Virgin Islands.  
That the judiciary here was so lenient with this defendant is appalling.  Given that there exists a 
common sense possibility that the teacher—an affirmed molester—would document his fantasies and 
encounters with children and utilize child pornography to drive and supplement his molestations, it was 
not unreasonable for the magistrate issuing the affidavit, or the law enforcement officers executing the 
search, to reason that a child molester would possess child pornography. 
 40. See id. at 423 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984)). 
 42. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011)). 
 43. V.I, 654 F.3d at 425–26.  Judge Fuentes continued: 
While [a well-trained] officer would have the benefit of several court of appeals opinions 
discussing the issue of whether probable cause to believe that someone has molested a 
child automatically provides probable cause to believe that someone will possess 
photographic evidence of that crime (or photos used to facilitate the crime—tools of a 
despicable trade), those opinions provide conflicting guidance. 
Id. at 425. 
 44. Id. at 426. 
 45. V.I, 654 F.3d at 426 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 
(1983)). 
 46. 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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defendant, a middle school teacher, was accused several times of 
looking up the skirts and down the shirts of female students in his sixth 
grade classroom.47  In the affidavit for a search warrant, the drafting 
investigator, a Sex Crimes and Juvenile Detective, requested a warrant 
to search for child pornography because, based upon his training and 
experience in child sex crimes, he knew subjects involved in this type of 
criminal behavior tend to possess child pornography.48  Despite the 
investigator’s extensive training and expertise in child sex crimes, the 
court held that “the affidavit contain[ed] no facts tying the acts of [the 
defendant] as a possible child molester to his possession of child 
pornography.”49  The court concluded that, while the “totality of the 
circumstances” could allow a court to find probable cause to search for 
child pornography, here, the investigator’s “conclusory statement tying 
this ‘subject,’ alleged to have molested two children and looked 
inappropriately at others, to ‘having in [his] possession child 
pornography’ [was] insufficient to create probable cause.”50 
Judge Brewster, concurring in Dougherty, found that there was 
adequate probable cause to issue a search warrant for child 
pornography.51  In agreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Colbert, 
 
 47. Id. at 896.  The Assistant Superintendent of the school investigated the allegations, and her 
report yielded that Dougherty had inappropriately touched the bra straps of several girls in his 
classroom.  Id.  These accusations were corroborated.  Id.  Another student recalled Dougherty touching 
her bare breast while they were alone in the classroom, with Dougherty calling her a “special girl.”  Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 898.  Although no child pornography was found during the search of the defendant’s 
home, id., that does not underscore the fact that child molesters often possess child pornography.  The 
investigator in this case based his assessment on a fourteen-year career devoted to investigating child 
sex crimes, id. at 896, so it was reasonable for him to purport that the defendant likely possessed child 
pornography.  Moreover, the context of the allegations against the defendant cannot be disregarded.  He 
was a teacher of a sixth grade classroom, and several female students said that the defendant had 
touched them in inappropriate ways.  Id.  Thus, this is not a simple case of a one-time child molester 
who may or may not continue his pattern of behavior in the future.  The defendant spent several hours, 
five days a week, with young girls in his classroom.  That he had continually been accused of 
inappropriately touching his female students, id., should send a red flag to the judiciary that his 
continual worshiping of sexual gratification of children could translate into him having documented 
these encounters or sexual gratifications at home.  Likewise, it would not be unreasonable for an 
investigator or law enforcement officer to determine that a child molester would possess child 
pornography along with his documentation of his sexual encounters with and sexual fantasies of 
children.  See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III. 
 50. Id. at 899.  Perhaps the officer needed to make a more detailed connection between the 
defendant’s inappropriate behavior and his likelihood of possessing child pornography in order for the 
court to find probable cause.  See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text and infra note 121.  This is 
because, in the Ninth Circuit, a magistrate must keep in mind that “all data necessary to show probable 
cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of a written 
affidavit given under oath.”  United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 175 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 51. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 901 (Brewster, J., concurring).  Judge Brewster’s opinion reads more 
like a dissent for purposes of this Comment, but his concurrence was based on the fact that he agreed 
that the police officers in this case were entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 902.  Thus, while Judge 
Brewster completely disagrees with the majority’s probable cause analysis, he was nonetheless 
8
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Judge Brewster found that “it is a common sense leap that an adult male, 
who teaches sixth graders, engaged in this type of inappropriate conduct 
[and] would likely possess child pornography.”52  In awarding deference 
to the magistrate judge and experience and training of the investigating 
officer, Judge Brewster reasoned that the defendant’s pattern of 
affirmative and inappropriate misconduct with several sixth grade 
students is “closely related to an interest in looking at sexual images of 
minors.”53  The facts suggested to the investigating officer, a highly 
trained and experienced Sex Crimes and Juvenile Detective, that a 
potential child predator had moved “along the continuum of looking and 
into the realm of touching.”54 
Further, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the good faith exception in 
United States v. Hodson.55  The court reasoned that a well-trained law 
enforcement officer in the field, upon looking at the warrant authorizing 
a search of the defendant’s residence and computers for child 
pornography images, would have realized a disconnect between the 
probable cause and crime described.56  Specifically, a law enforcement 
officer would have realized that the search for evidence of the crime of 
child pornography described in the warrant did not match the probable 
cause described, which was that evidence would be found of a different 
crime, that of child molestation.57  Noteworthy, however, is the court’s 
indication that a more specific affidavit, explicitly showing a relation or 
nexus between child molestation and child pornography, may have been 
sufficient to issue the warrant based on probable cause.58  The court 
reasoned that, since magistrates are not equipped to deduce “an 
empirical link between sexual deviance, or even sexual attraction, and 
pornography possession,” the affidavit must be supported with expert 
analysis linking the two together.59  Because standing alone, a “high 
 
compelled to concur rather than dissent.  See id. 
 52. Id. at 901. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 901–02.  Judge Brewster also added that the defendant’s “active misconduct 
distinguishes his case from the cases involving defendants who may have passively received unsolicited 
child pornography.”  Id. at 902. 
 55. 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 56. See id. at 289. 
 57. See id.; But see United States v. Haynes, 160 Fed. App’x 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2005) (court 
applied the good faith exception because “common sense dictates that there is a reasonable probability 
that an adult male who has expressed an interest in engaging in sexual activity with a minor . . . would 
possess child pornography or child erotica.”). 
 58. Hodson, 543 F.3d at 290; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.  For instance, 
it would be reasonable for the officers executing a search warrant to believe that a suspected child 
molester would possess child pornography and that one’s suspected status as a child molester could be 
probable cause for seizing the child pornography.  See Haynes, 160 Fed. App’x at 944 (basing analysis 
on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)). 
 59. Hodson, 543 F.3d at 291. 
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incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child 
pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely 
to possess child pornography,” a request for a warrant must explicitly 
spell out—with evidence—an inference to support the nexus.60 
III. DISCUSSION 
Since Colbert,61 federal courts have curtailed the allowance of 
investigators and law enforcement officers to seize child pornography 
when searching for evidence of child molestation.  Whether it is due to a 
tightening of Fourth Amendment rights, a bolstering of Due Process 
rights, or a decline in the “crime control” paradigm,62 the judiciary must 
reconsider its current path and cease from sacrificing the safety and 
well-being of children for a greater allocation of constitutional rights.  
Often, seizing child pornography may be the only way to link the 
defendant to child molestation.63  If the only documentation that exists is 
child pornography of children that he has molested, then seizing the 
child pornography is vital for conviction not only of possession of child 
pornography but also of the child molestation.64  Given the definitive 
relationship between child molestation and child pornography, courts 
must stop raising the Fourth Amendment ceiling if they want to alleviate 
the sexual exploitation of children. 
Part A of this discussion references numerous studies which show a 
definitive relationship—and, thus, more than a commonsense nexus—
between child molesters and those who possess child pornography.  
Parts B and C explicate the government’s and U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recognition of this nexus.  Part D concludes that this nexus is definitive 
enough to allow probable cause for a search warrant for child 
molestation to be adequate probable cause for a search warrant for child 
pornography.  Finally, Part E proposes a solution that courts should 
adhere to when deciding these cases—a solution that harmonizes Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence with the concerns and societal interests in 
protecting the safety and well-being of potential child sexual victims. 
 
 60. Id. at 293–94; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text; United States v. Falso, 
544 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (probable cause for child pornography does not lie where the affidavit 
alleged that the defendant had a conviction—eighteen years prior—of sexual abuse on a minor). 
 61. See supra Part II(C). 
 62. For the original discussion of the “crime control” paradigm, see Herbert L. Packer, Two 
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
 63. See infra Part III(A), (B), and (C). 
 64. See supra notes 2, 29 and accompanying text. 
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A. Studies Indicate a Nexus Between Child Molesters and Viewers of 
Child Pornography 
Since the dawn of the Internet led to a rapid increase in child 
pornography, a number of studies have illustrated the link between child 
molestation and possession of child pornography.65  For instance, the 
Mayo Clinic published studies and case reports which indicated that up 
to 80% of individuals who viewed child pornography and 76% of 
individuals who were arrested for online child pornography had 
molested a child.66 
For another example, a widely discussed study recently conducted at 
the Federal Corrections Facility in Butner, North Carolina, revealed that 
child pornography offenders are almost always child molesters as 
well—they were just not caught.67  A shocking 85% of the child 
 
 65. See, e.g., Candice Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing Child 
Pornography and Molesting Children, 1 CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION PROGRAM UPDATE 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Update_gr_vol1_no3.pdf (noting that, of a study based on 1,400 
cases of child molestation over a four year period, pornography was connected with every incident of 
molestation, and child pornography was used in a majority of those cases); Neil Malamuth & Mark 
Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child Pornography: Bringing the Law in Line with the Research 
Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 773, 794 (2007); but see, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, 
Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 875 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hessick, Disentangling] (“empirical literature is unable to validate the assumption that there 
is a causal connection between possession of child pornography and child sex abuse.”).  While 
Hessick’s article asserts there is a lack of causation between the two child sex crimes, this Comment 
seeks to show that the mere correlation between child molestation and child pornography is the 
determinative factor for a probable cause analysis. 
 66. Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of 
Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82(4) MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 
457, 460 (2007), available at http://www.drryanhall.com/Articles/pedophiles.pdf.  However, the authors 
note that it is difficult to know how many people progress from computerized child pornography to 
physical acts against children and how many would have progressed to physical acts without the 
computer being involved.  Id. 
 67. Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A Report of the 
Incidence of Hands-On Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 
183, 189 (2009) [hereinafter “Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study”]; see also Julian Sher & Benedict 
Carey, Debate on Child Pornography’s Link to Molesting, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?pagewanted=all (commentary from the Butner 
study’s researchers); Andres E. Hernandez, Position Paper, Psychological and Behavioral 
Characteristics of Child Pornography Offenders in Treatment, (2009), 
http://www.iprc.unc.edu/G8/Hernandez_position_paper_Global_Symposium.pdf.  The Butner study was 
conducted from 2002 to 2005.  Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study, at 186.  Even prior to the dot com 
boom, child molestation and possession of child pornography went hand-in-hand.  See OKLAHOMANS 
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, OCAF WHITE PAPER ON INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY 9 (1997), available at 
http://walrustalk.com/3/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/agincourt1.pdf (in a 1994 study of convicted child 
molesters, 77 percent of those who molested boys and 87 percent of those who molested girls admitted 
to the habitual use of pornography in the commission of their crimes).  Even more problematic is that 
child pornography offenders with a prior history of contact sexual offenses are more likely to sexually 
reoffend.  Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal Histories and Later Offending of Child 
Pornography Offenders, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE 201, 207 (2005). 
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pornography offenders said they had committed acts of sexual abuse 
against minors, which ranged from inappropriate touching to rape.68  Of 
the offenders who admitted to molesting children in some way, the 
average number of victims per perpetrator was 13.56.69  The chief 
psychologist of the study, Michael L. Bourke, stated: 
There is this assumption—in the treatment context, in courtrooms, in 
investigative circles and in the assessment literature—that [child 
pornographer users and child molesters] are dichotomous groups.  
However, in the course of treatment, these men would disclose to us that 
their use of the Internet was not the limit of their sexual acting out—it 
was in fact an adjunctive behavior.70 
Although criticism surrounds the study,71 many scholars have concluded 
that there exists a complex and reciprocal interaction between viewing 
child pornography and perpetrating sexual offenses with children.72  
Bourke concluded that although child pornography use and child 
molestation were previously “seemingly distinct forms of criminality,” 
the study now highlights the co-morbidity and strong relationship 
between the two child sexual crimes.73 
Furthermore, child molesters use child pornography in at least four 
primary ways: (1) to sexually arouse and gratify themselves,74 (2) to 
 
 68. Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study, supra note 67, at 187.  Similarly, since child 
pornography is often used to entice young victims, “a person of reasonable caution would take into 
account predelictions revealed by past crimes or convictions as part of the inquiry into probable cause.”  
United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). 
 69. Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study, supra note 67, at 187. 
 70. Tori DeAngelis, Porn Use and Child Abuse, 40 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 56, 56 (2009) 
(internal quotations omitted), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/12/child-abuse.aspx. 
 71. For instance, the head of the Sexual Disorders Clinic at Johns Hopkins felt that the study 
would generalize too much and would have conflicting implications for community safety and 
individual liberties.  See Matt Anderson, Controversial Study Strongly Links Child Porn Use and Child 
Abuse, LIFE SITE NEWS, Dec. 11, 2009, 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2009/dec/09121109; see also Hessick, Disentangling, 
supra note 65, at 875 (“empirical literature is unable to validate the assumption that there is a causal 
connection between possession of child pornography and child sex abuse”). 
 72. To illustrate, a longitudinal study of 341 convicted child molesters found that pornography 
use correlated significantly with their rate of sexually re-offending.  Drew A. Kingston, Paul Fedoroff, 
Philip Firestone, Susan Curry, & John M. Bradford, Pornography Use and Sexual Aggression: The 
Impact of Frequency and Type of Pornography Use on Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, 34 
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 1, 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.ccoso.org/library%20articles/aggressivebehavior.pdf.  Frequency of pornography use was 
primarily a further risk factor for higher-risk offenders, or those that show a stronger association 
between child pornography and child sexual aggression.  Id. 
 73. See Matt Anderson, Controversial Study Strongly Links Child Porn Use and Child Abuse, 
LIFE SITE NEWS, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2009/dec/09121109. 
 74. “Even if some of them never go on to sexually victimize a child, it is reasonable to view and 
treat arrested [child pornography] possessors as at high risk for victimizing children.”  JANIS WOLAK ET 
AL., CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM 
THE NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 3 (2005), available at 
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lower children’s inhibitions,75 (3) to blackmail the child by seducing 
him or her into sexual activity,76 and (4) to allow other offenders access 
to other children.77  These uses alone illustrate the link between child 
pornography possessors and child molesters.  Because possessors of 
child pornography often use the pornography as a medium and aid to 
sexually prey upon children, there is room for conflicting affirmation in 
the argument that child molestation and possession of child pornography 
are “separate crimes” not worthy of joint probable cause. 
Consequently, the foregoing data cannot be ignored: there exists at 
least a general correlation between child molesters and possessors of 
child pornography.78  Therefore, crime control must strengthen to seize 
child pornography, given that possessors of child pornography utilize 
the pornography to entice and sexually exploit children. 
B. The Government’s Recognition of the Nexus 
Government entities have long recognized the harm of child 
pornography and have recently emphasized the link between child 
molestation and child pornography.79  In a congressional statement by  
 
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf. 
 75. For example, “individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize child pornography 
to reduce the inhibitions of their victims.”  United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
 76. Lanning, Child Molesters, supra note 1, at 90; see also Michael Medaris & Cathy Girouard, 
Protecting Children in Cyberspace: The ICAC Task Force Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE BULLETIN, Jan. 2002, at 2 [hereinafter Protecting Children in Cyberspace], available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/191213.pdf (by exposing children to pornographic images of other 
victims with the intention of building a sense of comfort and by using pictures of the victim to coerce 
them into keeping quiet, offenders are ultimately able to use these pornographic images as a tool to exert 
power over their victims). 
 77. Lanning, Child Molesters, supra note 1, at 90; see also 149 Cong. Rec. S2573, S2584 (daily 
ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Congress has long recognized that child pornography 
produces three distinct and lasting harms to our children.  First, child pornography whets the appetites of 
pedophiles and prompts them to act out their perverse sexual fantasies on real children.  Second, child 
pornography is a tool used by pedophiles to break down the inhibitions of children.  Third, child 
pornography creates an immeasurable and indelible harm on the children who are abused to manufacture 
it.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Michael C. Seto, James M. Cantor & Ray Blanchard, Child Pornography Offenses 
Are a Valid Diagnostic Indicator of Pedophilia, 115 JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 610, 613 
(2006) (child abuse image possession may be a “stronger indicator of pedophilia than is [previously] 
sexually offending against a child.”); id. at 611 (in one recent study, roughly half of a sample of child 
pornography offenders had also been charged with a child sexual offense); Bourke & Hernandez, Butner 
Study, supra note 67, at 183 (“Internet offenders in our sample were significantly more likely than not to 
have sexually abused a child via a hands-on act.”). 
 79. See supra note 78; see also Protecting Children in Cyberspace, supra note 76 (strong 
anecdotal evidence exists among those involved in prosecuting child pornography cases that there is a 
strong correlation between those who collect child pornography and those convicted of child 
molestation in seeking out potential victims).  Further, the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 
which has since been repealed on First Amendment grounds, details that Congress finds:  
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, a member of the 
Crimes Against Children Unit stated that there is “a strong correlation 
between child pornography offenders and molesters of children” and 
that “the correlation between collection of child pornography and actual 
child abuse is too real and too grave to ignore.”80  Similarly, Congress 
has found that “child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child 
sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a 
model for sexual acting out with children.”81  For example, one 
congressionally-adopted study found that up to 90% of pedophiles 
reported using child pornography, often immediately before committing 
an act of child molestation.82  Further, “a significant portion of child 
pornography offenders have a criminal history that involves the sexual 
abuse or exploitation of children . . . .”83  Law enforcement officers have 
confirmed to Congress that child sexual predators almost always collect 
 
[C]hild pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children into 
sexual activity . . . child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual 
abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual 
acting out with children; such use of child pornography can desensitize the viewer to the 
pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can become acceptable to 
and even preferred by the viewer . . . the existence of and traffic in child pornographic 
images creates the potential for many types of harm in the community and presents a 
clear and present danger to all children . . . [child pornography] inflames the desires of 
child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers who prey on children, thereby 
increasing the creation and distribution of child pornography and the sexual abuse and 
exploitation of actual children who are victimized as a result of the existence and use of 
these materials . . . [and] prohibiting the possession and viewing of child pornography 
will encourage the possessors of such material to rid themselves of or destroy the 
material, thereby helping to protect the victims of child pornography and to eliminate the 
market for the sexual exploitative use of children. 
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–26 
(1996) (repealed 2002 on First Amendment grounds). 
 80. Enhancing Child Protection Laws After the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision, 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Sec. of the Homeland Sec. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Michael J. 
Heimbach, Crimes Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative Div, Fed. Bureau of Investigation), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/heimbach050102.htm; see also United States v. Brand, 
467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “possession of child pornography . . . shares a 
connection . . . with pedophilia.”). 
 81. Brand, 467 F.3d at 198; see also David B. Johnson, Why the Possession of Computer-
Generated Child Pornography Can Be Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 311, 327–
28 (1994) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: 
FINAL REPORT 649–50 (1986)) (concluding there is evidence that child pornography may induce 
viewers to commit sex crimes on children). 
 82. See 149 Cong. Rec. H9735 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2003) (statement of Rep. Osborne). 
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child pornography or child erotica.84  
C. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Nexus 
The Supreme Court has long recognized the relationship of child 
pornography and child molestation.85  As early as 1982, the Supreme 
Court, in criminalizing child pornography86 in New York v. Ferber,87 
reasoned that child pornography “is intrinsically related to the sexual 
abuse of children” because “the materials produced are a permanent 
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is 
exacerbated by their circulation.”88  Thus, the Supreme Court “approved 
as narrowly tailored the banning of child pornography, including its 
possession, in part because of the causal link between child 
pornography . . . and the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.”89 
Additionally, in United States v. Byrd,90 the Supreme Court, in 
finding the defendant’s pedophilic behavior was properly used to show 
his predisposition to order and receive child pornography, reasoned: 
Pedophiles use child pornography for gratifying their own sexual desires, 
reducing the inhibitions of their victims and instructing their victims on 
proper sexual performance.  In addition to citing the case law and expert 
testimony that links pedophilia to child pornography, we also note that 
common sense would indicate that a person who is sexually interested in 
children is likely to also be inclined, i.e., predisposed, to order and 
receive child pornography.91 
Finally, that the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in United 
States v. Colbert92 ostensibly illustrates that the Court does not wholly 
disagree with the Eight Circuit’s conclusion that the link between child 
 
 84. United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-
358, at 12–13 (1996)); see also Lara N. Strayer, Ambiguous Laws Do Little to Erase “Kiddieporn,” 5 
TEMP POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 169, 178 (1996) (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S10322-04 at S10323 (daily ed. 
July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Helms) (police officer estimated that fifty percent of child molesters at 
the time of their arrest had in their possession numerous “kiddie-porn” videotapes and magazines)).  
While this latter statement is over two decades old, such a trend is nonetheless true—and even more true 
today—given the explosion of child pornography on the Internet. 
 85. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (“evidence suggests that pedophiles use 
child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.”); see also supra notes 13–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 86. See supra Part II(B). 
 87. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 88. Id. at 759. 
 89. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 920 (4th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 
1014 (2002). 
 90. 31 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 91. Id. at 1339. 
 92. 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
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molestation and child pornography allows evidence of child molestation 
behavior to serve as an adequate basis for a search warrant for child 
pornography. 
D. The Nexus in Conjunction with the Fourth Amendment: The 
Exclusionary Rule is Meant to be a Rare Exception 
In the cases in which defendants have argued that law enforcement 
officers infringed upon their constitutional rights in searching for child 
pornography when the warrant authorized a search only for evidence of 
child molestation, the success of the argument has hinged on the 
exclusionary rule.  Specifically, defendants have successfully 
suppressed evidence of child pornography because the searches for child 
pornography were outside the scope of the search warrants for evidence 
of child molestation.  Courts’ overuse of the exclusionary rule conflicts 
not only with the original intent of the rule,93 but also with public policy 
in applying the rule in cases like the ones discussed in this Comment, 
where the safety and well-being of children are at stake. 
The primary purpose of the judicially created exclusionary rule “is to 
deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the 
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and 
seizures[.]”94  However, the exclusionary rule is not intended to prevent 
all police misconduct or to be a remedy for all police errors because it is 
“an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of 
constitutional rights.”95  Accordingly, the exclusionary rule’s application 
in the circumstances described by this Comment is, as elucidated below, 
misplaced. 
A recent Supreme Court case discusses the social costs of the 
exclusionary rule that coincide with this Comment; that is, that the 
exclusionary rule exists does not mean the judiciary should enforce it 
when doing so sacrifices public safety and well-being.  The Supreme 
Court in Davis v. United States96 emphasized: 
Real deterrent value is a necessary condition for exclusion of evidence, 
but it is not a sufficient one.  The analysis must also account for the 
substantial social costs generated by the [exclusionary] rule.  Exclusion 
exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large.  It 
almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence 
bearing on guilt or innocence.  And its bottom-line effect, in many cases, 
is to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community 
 
 93. See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 94. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). 
 95. United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 96. 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
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without punishment . . . . [S]ociety must swallow this bitter pill when 
necessary, but only as a last resort.  For exclusion to be appropriate, the 
deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.97 
Correspondingly, whatever minimal deterrence effect the 
exclusionary rule may possess is outweighed by the need to not let those 
who sexually exploit children by means of child molestation or child 
pornography go free.  If a warrant for a search for evidence of child 
molestation is proper, then deterrence will have little impact on a law 
enforcement officer searching an alleged child molester’s home for 
supplemental evidence of child pornography. Because searches must 
only be reasonable,98 it would not be unreasonable for a law 
enforcement officer to suspect that a presumed child molester would 
document his child sexual encounters in some form of medium on a 
computer.99  Nor would it be unreasonable for a law enforcement officer 
to suspect that a presumed child molester would have taken pictures of 
his encounter and have them loaded to his computer.  Nor would it be 
unreasonable for a law enforcement officer to suspect that a presumed 
child molester would have engaged in online chats in an underage chat 
room to search for potential victims.100  In any of these probable 
hypothetical situations, it would be reasonable for the law enforcement 
officer to conduct his search for child molestation on the computer.101  
And, accordingly, there is little—if any—deterrent effect if the law 
enforcement officer who, already searching the computer, conducts a 
search for child pornography.  Ultimately, it would not be unreasonable 
for a law enforcement officer—a public servant to her community—to 
 
 97. Id. at 2427 (internal citations omitted). 
 98. See supra Part II(A).  Furthermore, the standards for determining probable cause for a search 
warrant apply to a search for child pornography on a computer.  United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 
1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 99. For instance, in United States. v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008), the magistrate 
issuing the warrant found that the detective’s:  
Failure to include her opinion as the critical link to establish probable cause does not 
reduce the Affidavit to mere suspicion or belief’ because ‘[t]hese suspected crimes are 
not as ‘unrelated’ to child pornography as [the defendant] contends; both the cited 
conduct and the sought evidence involve sexual exploitation of minors. 
Id. at 291.  However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the magistrate’s justification for admitting the child 
pornography as evidence.  Id. at 292. 
 100. All of the foregoing examples would be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A, which relates to 
prohibiting child pornography, or 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which prohibits a person from “knowingly 
[attempting to] persuade, induce, entice and coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual activity.  18 
U.S.C. § 1466A (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006). 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 579 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1469 (Feb. 22, 2011) (“even if we were to hold that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause [for a 
search for child pornography], suppression of the evidence would not be appropriate because [the 
defendant] has not shown that the officers acted unreasonably in carrying out the search.”). 
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want to seize a child molester’s child pornography collection to alleviate 
the incidence of child sexual exploitation, especially since child sexual 
abusers are more likely than others in the general population to possess 
child pornography.102 
E. Solutions  
Given that there is at least an intuitive relationship between child 
molestation and possession of child pornography, both law enforcement 
officers and the judiciary cannot ignore that relationship when 
determining whether probable cause for a search warrant for child 
pornography exists on the basis of child molestation.  First, a fluid 
probable cause standard, coupled with the expertise of the investigating 
officer and deference to the magistrate, will prove sufficient to authorize 
a valid search warrant.  Likewise, a detailed affidavit that explicitly 
explains the connection between child pornography and child 
molestation will also prove sufficient to authorize a valid search 
warrant.  Conversely, if a magistrate finds a detailed affidavit drafted by 
the investigating officer insufficient, then expert analyses cited within 
the affidavit, corroborating the nexus between child pornography and 
child molestation, will also be enough to validate a search warrant.  
Finally, if a magistrate refuses to authorize a search warrant 
notwithstanding the foregoing solutions and notwithstanding the 
definitive relationship between child molestation and possession of child 
pornography, then the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
will prohibit suppression of child pornography evidence because 
suppression would impose great societal costs and would prove 
counterproductive in the effort to combat child sexual exploitation.  The 
foregoing solutions are examined in depth below. 
1. Fluid, Non-Technical Probable Cause Standard and Deference to 
Investigators 
Probable cause for a search exists when the facts and circumstances 
within an officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably 
trustworthy information, convince the officer to believe that sufficient 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched.103  Further, neither 
“certainty nor a preponderance of the evidence is required[,]” but rather 
 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–26 (1996) 
(repealed 2002 on First Amendment grounds)). 
 103. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
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a “fair probability” that the evidence will be found is sufficient.104  Thus, 
there need not be direct evidence of solicitation of child pornography to 
create probable cause.105 
Moreover, in determining whether there is a fair probability that 
evidence will be found in a particular place, the experience and training 
of the investigating officer should be taken into consideration.  Evidence 
must be “seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, 
but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”106  
Probable cause is thus a fluid concept that depends on the probabilities 
in particular factual contexts.107  The factual determinations made by 
investigators in the field need not be correct, they just must be 
reasonable.108  Accordingly, law enforcement officers who have worked 
for years in combating child molestation and child pornography have 
seen the link between the two crimes first-hand.  Great deference should 
be awarded to the initial, on-the-scene determination that probable cause 
has been established.109  Likewise, notwithstanding the expertise of the 
investigating officer, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment search 
warrant cannot be forgotten: deference to the magistrate.110  It is not 
wholly unreasonable for a magistrate judge to assume that probable 
cause based on sexual activity with a minor would support a search for 
child pornography.111  A combination of the investigating officer’s 
specialized experience in child exploitation crimes, coupled with a 
magistrate’s legal knowledge of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
provides an adequate basis to search for child pornography on the basis 
of child molestation suspicions.112 
 
 104. United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 246 (1983)). 
 105. Id. at 1055. 
 106. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 
 107. Kelley, 482 F.3d at 1050. 
 108. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990). 
 109. See United States v. Maxim, 55 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 110. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
 111. United States v. Baker, 2:04-CR-00427-RCJ-RJJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58021, at *14–15 
(D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2006), aff’d, 281 Fed. App’x 705 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tex. v. Brown, 460 U.S. 
730, 742 (1983) (the probable cause standard does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct 
or more likely true than false). 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[l]aw 
enforcement investigations have verified that pedophiles almost always collect child pornography or 
child erotica.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12–13 (1996)).  For instance, in United States v. 
Burdulis, No. 10-40003-FDS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53612 (D. Mass. May 19, 2011), the court found 
that the affidavit contained a sufficient “nexus”; specifically, “the affidavit provided sufficient 
information to infer a rational nexus between the enumerated crimes and  ‘pornographic materials,’ 
including . . . child pornography.”  Id. at *31–32.  Thus the court denied the defendant’s motion to 
suppress the seizure of child pornography.  Id. at *49; see also United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 
1263, 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (warrant authorizing search for child pornography as evidence of 
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Additionally, courts may also apply a “sliding scale” to probable 
cause determinations.  Under a sliding scale approach, the degree of 
suspicion required to constitute probable cause would depend on the 
individual and societal interests implicated in the specific case.113  Here, 
as elucidated above, the public interests in the safety and well-being of 
children are beyond compelling.  However, this is not to say that 
someone has limited Fourth Amendment protection merely because 
society has an interest in assuring that children are not exposed to child 
sexual exploitation.  Rather, law enforcement officers and child sex 
crimes investigators will, under this approach, be able to link the crimes 
of child pornography possession and child molestation together in a 
more direct manner.  For example, assume a man is suspected of 
molesting children and such accusations have been corroborated by his 
victims.  Such accusations would impact the man’s individual interests.  
However, the societal interests of the safety and well-being of 
children—especially the man’s victims—would significantly outweigh 
any of his individual interests.  Accordingly, the corroborated 
accusations of repeated child molestation behavior could serve as 
adequate probable cause for a search not only for evidence of the child 
molestation, but also child pornography, given the definitive relationship 
between the two. 
Likewise, without discussion of the good faith exception at this 
point,114 some of the federal courts of appeals’ decisions suggest that the 
“totality of the circumstances” paradigm could, in some instances, allow 
courts to find probable cause to search for child pornography.115  For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit suggested that, if there is evidence that an 
alleged child molester had actually enticed a child to come into his 
apartment, then probable cause for child pornography would also lie, 
given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search.116 
 
crime of “sexual exploitation of a child” was valid). 
 113. See United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1990) (favoring a sliding-scale 
approach, the court observed that “circumstances defy . . . simple categorization, and if a [probable 
cause] line must . . . be drawn it will be arbitrary, with nearly identical cases on opposite sides.”); see 
also Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized Procedures”: The 
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974) (preference for sliding-scale approach because 
a “highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing 
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions” would be unfeasible). 
 114. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2011).  The Supreme Court 
merely requires that an affidavit be read in its totality and in a commonsense manner.  See Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32 (1983); see also United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 465 (1st Cir. 
2005) (“[s]earch warrants and affidavits should be considered in a common sense manner, and hyper-
technical readings should be avoided.”) (quoting United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 868 (1st Cir. 
1986)). 
 116. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 899; see also United States v. McBurnette, 382 Fed. App’x 813, 
815 (11th Cir. 2010) (in finding the affidavit for search warrant not stale, the court reasoned that the 
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Moreover, at least for cases like Dougherty and John,117 it is a common 
sense leap that an adult male, a teacher who has been accused of 
inappropriately touching his female students on several occasions, 
would likely possess child pornography.118  Ultimately, the nexus 
element can and should “be inferred from the type of crime, the nature 
of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity for concealment and 
normal inferences as to where a criminal would hide evidence of the 
crime in question.”119  However, for the courts that will not jump to such 
a nexus based on inferences, perhaps a more detailed affidavit that 
explicitly clarifies the connection between child pornography and child 
molestation would suffice.120  Because such a definitive relationship 
exists,121 an extra step in the application for a warrant process could 
prove crucial in prosecuting those who prey on children with both child 
molestation and possession of child pornography. 
2. The Use of Experts to Corroborate the “Nexus” 
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, if a court finds that standing 
alone, a high incidence of child molestation does not demonstrate 
probable cause for a search for child molestation, then use of expert 
analysis to draw the nexus will suffice.122  The use of an expert might 
also be necessary in cases where the warrant was based on the law 
enforcement officer’s experience in child sexual crimes; specifically, 
since the Fourth Amendment requires an objective reasonableness 
 
victim detailed incidents that occurred two years prior, including incidents that the defendant made her 
watch child pornography with him and that the officers—with their knowledge that pedophiles never 
dispose of their child pornography—had reason to believe that the pornography would still be in the 
house even though the sexual molestation occurred two years prior). 
 117. See supra Part II(D). 
 118. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text; see also Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 901 
(Brewster, J., concurring); United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 119. United States v. Walker, 145 Fed. App’x 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. 
Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979)). 
 120. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text; see also V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 419 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“Because the question is one that can be resolved only through the evaluation of evidence, it 
must be alleged on the face of the affidavit in order to be considered for purposes of determining 
probable cause.”); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (given that child molestation 
and child pornography are separate offenses, the affidavit must draw a correlation between a person’s 
propensity to commit both types of crimes for the search warrant to cover a search for child 
pornography); Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 898 (the affidavit must contain facts tying a defendant as a 
possible child molester to his possession of child pornography); United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 
289 (6th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that if the affidavit for a warrant established, alleged, or suggested that 
the defendant, a purported child molester, would be involved with child pornography, then the nexus 
will be seen by the magistrate and thus probable cause will lie for a search for child pornography). 
 121. See supra Part III(A). 
 122. See, e.g., Hodson, 543 F.3d at 289 (suggesting that expert testimony of a relational nexus 
between child molestation and child pornography could establish probable cause). 
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standard, a law enforcement officer’s subjective expertise may not be 
enough.  For instance, in United States v. Adkins,123 the court found that: 
[An] affidavit [that] set[s] forth other information on the likelihood of a 
molester’s possessing pornography, namely the FBI’s “institutional 
knowledge,” [will suffice] . . . . This “institutional knowledge” included 
the information that preferential offenders devote time, money, and 
energy to the pursuit of child pornography or sexual contact with 
children; that they typically keep collections of child pornography or 
“child erotica”; and that they have well-developed techniques for gaining 
access to child pornography or child victims.  This information, in 
conjunction with [the officer’s] determination that [the defendant] is a 
preferential offender, supports a finding that [the defendant] was 
reasonably likely to possess child pornography.124 
Since magistrates often cannot deduce the definitive link between 
child molestation and possession of child pornography, a warrant under 
these circumstances must also contain an expert’s analysis.  Specifically, 
given the instinctive and now definitively confirmed relationship 
between the two crimes, probable cause for a search for evidence of 
child molestation will equally suffice as probable cause for a search for 
possession of child pornography. 
3. The Good Faith Exception125 
Although the preceding solution is the ideal one given the definitive 
relationship between child molestation and possession of child 
pornography, a discussion of invoking the good faith exception is 
warranted.  Consequently, the failure to state explicitly the connection 
between child molestation and child pornography in an affidavit does 
not support a contention that the law enforcement officers were 
unreasonable or grossly negligent as to warrant exclusion of evidence.  
For example, even the Second Circuit, which found the connection 
between child molestation and child pornography to be nothing more 
than an “inferential fallacy of ancient standing,”126 could not come to the 
conclusion that a police officer acting on a warrant based on such an 
assumption was entirely unreasonable.127  Excluding evidence where the 
law enforcement officers did not act recklessly or with gross negligence, 
such as excluding the evidence in child pornography cases, would 
impose great costs and would “offend[] basic concepts of the criminal 
 
 123. 169 Fed. App’x 961 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 854 (2006), 549 U.S. 856 (2006). 
 124. Id. at 967. 
 125. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 126. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 127. See id. at 125–28. 
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justice system.”128  Suppression is necessary “only if the officers were 
dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have 
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable 
cause.”129  None of the cases discussed in this Comment indicate that the 
investigating officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their 
affidavits.  Accordingly, in the very least, the good faith exception 
should have been applied in each case to keep the evidence of child 
pornography from being suppressed. 
Likewise, if an affidavit that states, for example, that “individuals 
who exploit children use computers to locate, view, download, collect 
and organize images of child pornography found through the Internet,” 
and that connection is substantiated by a citation to studies outlining the 
definitive relationship between child molestation and possession of child 
pornography, then it would not be unreasonable for a law enforcement 
officer executing the search with a warrant based on that affidavit to 
reasonably believe that inference to be true.  Similarly, it would not be 
unreasonable for an officer executing a search warrant based on an 
affidavit that explicitly states, with supportive expert data, that the 
defendant’s “contemporaneous attempt[s]” to molest children 
predisposes him to possess child pornography, to assume that the child 
molester indeed likely possesses child pornography.130  And again, there 
must only be a “fair probability”131—not a substantial or significant 
likelihood—that the child pornography will be found.  Consequently, so 
long as the officers deem there is a fair probability that child 
pornography will be found in the home of a suspected child molester, 
then no Fourth Amendment rights will be violated. 
Furthermore, there is no doubt that “[t]he good faith exception may 
be applied to a search conducted pursuant to an overly broad 
warrant.”132  As a result, an overly broad search warrant for a search for 
 
 128. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984); see also V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 417 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“Suppression of valuable evidence imposes social costs by hindering the courts’ truth-
seeking function . . . .”). 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984)). 
 130. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 
(2011).  Further: 
If even the experts cannot agree on whether probable cause to search for evidence of 
child molestation provides probable cause to search for child pornography, it [is] not 
objectively unreasonable—let alone, entirely unreasonable—for [the detective drafting 
the affidavit] to take one side of the controversy over the other . . . .  
V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d at 425 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 131. United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 246 (1983)). 
 132. United States v. Travers, 233 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. 
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child pornography, when supported only by facts of child molestation, 
might nonetheless be a “reasonable” search and seizure if the officer 
executing the search acted reasonably and in a good faith reliance on the 
facts of the affidavit.133  Such a reliance on the affidavit would be more 
than a mere “unsupported hunch[]” in which officers base their warrant 
assessment on unexamined biases and stereotypes.134  Rather, the 
officers would conscientiously assess the facts supporting the affidavit 
and, with their expertise in child exploitation crimes and reasonable 
reliance on the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant, the search 
would be deemed “reasonable” based on the good faith exception. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of Colbert,135 other similar cases, and the dissents and 
concurrences in opinions opposing the Colbert decision,136 there exists 
at least a commonsense link between child molestation and possession 
of child pornography.  Moreover, recent studies now also illustrate a 
definitive relationship between child molestation and a molester’s 
collection of child pornography.  Accordingly, given this established 
relationship, evidence of child molestation behavior should confer 
probable cause for a warrant to search for child pornography.  The 
substantiated link between these two child sexual exploitative crimes 
elucidated in the recent studies will now serve as a source for 
investigators who ask a magistrate judge to authorize a search warrant 
for child pornography.  The link will also serve as an affirmation to 
judges during suppression hearings who will now be able to rely on such 
studies without fear of trampling on the Fourth Amendment.  
Ultimately, now that the relationship between child molestation and 
possession of child pornography has been definitively established, the 
judiciary will be more adept to serve society’s interests in combating the 
pervasiveness of child sexual exploitative crimes. 
 
Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 133. “[A]pplicable precedent requires us to determine the culpability of a police officer’s conduct 
in an objective fashion, asking whether ‘a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the 
search was illegal in light of all the circumstances.’”  John, 654 F.3d at 424 (quoting United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)). 
 134. Id. at 421. 
 135. See supra Part II(C). 
 136. See supra Part II(D). 
24
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/9
